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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Foreign Direct Investment (hereon referred as FDI) is highly accredited for inducing 
growth and has become synonymous with the term “spillover”. However these spillovers 
can either be positive (Litchtenberg & Potterie 1998, Brown et. al 2002) or negative 
(Blomstrom 1989, Aitken & Harrison 1999). Despite such contradictions, academicians 
and policy makers alike are banking on it to boost growth and reduce poverty. According 
to Asiedu (2005), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) proposes that 
Africa should resort to FDI to bridge the annual resource gap of $64 billion that is needed 
for poverty alleviation. Perhaps the most ambitious expectation yet, as she points out, is 
the United Nations expectation that FDI will halve extreme poverty by 2015 as declared 
in their Millennium Development Goals. These great expectations appear to be reflected 
in the current global demand and dramatic surge in FDI.  According to UNCTAD1 
(2005), worldwide FDI was $896.7 billion, up by 29% from the previous year with 
increases to developing countries of $273.5 billion and developed countries of about 
$537.2 billion (see Appendix 3).  
The increase in the worldwide volume is equally marked by a tight race that has 
generated an uneven distribution, with many countries being marginalized. According to 
the World Bank (2004),“ flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing countries 
have declined by 26 percent since 1999, while China’s share has increased from 21 
percent to 39 percent. FDI levels in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia have 
remained low”. This demonstrates a clear uphill battle for many developing countries; 
while some claim success, many others find this quest evasive. Coupled with this trend is 
                                                
1 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
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the heightened concern that FDI to some developing countries may be motivated by a 
scramble for natural resources2. The World Bank (2005) also indicates that,“FDI to the 
African nations has increased in all the major oil producing countries (including Sudan) 
as well as in Egypt and South Africa. Over all FDI to the region reached an estimated 
new record of $ 29 billion”. Despite a growing concern, research is lacking on FDIs 
association with natural resource intensity. Unfortunately, previous studies have only 
focused on spillover effects in the manufacturing sectors (Brown et al 2002, Blomstrom 
& Wolf 1994, Aitken & Harrison 1999). Some authors like Asiedu (2005) have however 
commented on FDIs relation to the natural resource sector. She remarks,  “FDI does not 
have the positive spillovers of job creation and technology transfers because countries 
that are rich in resources generally channel FDI to the natural resource industries”. The 
implication is that the non-resource sectors (including the manufacturing sector) will not 
gain any positive externalities.  
However this fact remains unsubstantiated. Consequently, an investigation into 
this matter is direly needed in the literature. The role of the natural resource sector has 
equally been called into question by Sachs & Warner (1997) (hereafter SW (1997)). They 
attribute the depressed growth behavior of resource-endowed countries to the Dutch 
disease and Rent-seeking activities associated with the “Natural Resource Curse”. Their 
research concludes that,“ resource-abundant countries tended to be high-price economies 
and that, partly as a consequence, these countries tended to miss-out on export-led 
growth” (SW 1997). Both notions evoke a critical question of how FDI will perform in 
the context of natural resource abundance? Will the Natural Resource Curse prevail or 
                                                
2 See Asiedu 2005 for further discussions 
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can FDI dominate and consequently stimulate growth, reduce poverty and income 
inequality?  What can policy makers do to ensure a desirable impact?   
In lieu of this fact, we specifically seek to investigate FDIs effect on economic 
development, income inequality and poverty given the role of the Dutch disease and 
Rent- seeking behavior in resource abundant countries. This study will effectively 
broaden our understanding of the key forces that drive this relationship and will 
concurrently guide us with appropriate policies accordingly. The paper will be divided as 
follows: Section 2 covers the background of FDI, the Natural Resource Curse, the Dutch 
disease and rent- seeking effects; Section 3 illustrates the functioning of FDI in a 
theoretical framework; Section 4 summarizes literature on FDI and growth, income 
inequality and poverty; Section 5 presents the hypotheses, models and data used in the 
empirical analysis; Section 6 presents the results of our empirical investigation. Section 7 
draws the conclusion and proposes policies and future research. 
2.  Background 
2.1 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
As supposed to other capital flows, FDI is an “investment involving a long-term 
relationship and reflecting a lasting interest of a resident entity in one economy (direct 
investor) in an entity in an economy other than that of the investor” (UNCTAD 2004). 
The IMF also defines it as a “category of international investment that reflects the 
objective of a resident in one economy (the direct investor) obtaining a lasting interest in 
an enterprise resident in another economy” (IMF 2005). Hood & Young (1979) explain 
that prior to 1914 portfolio investment was the predominant mode of capital; the UK 
emerged as the key creditor nation investing 60% in the US and Australia, particularly in 
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government securities and the railway sector. FDI then gained momentum after World 
War II during when it was pursued as a means to induce growth. Both the invention of 
the aircraft and the computer supposedly enhanced the spread of capital by facilitating 
transnational production.  FDI progressively became significant in jumpstarting 
development in many countries. In the 1950’s, it was advocated under the guise of   
“industrialization by invitation”. This concept involved the formation of a backward-
linking operation between a Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and a corresponding 
host country. The arrangement of a supplier of capital and infrastructure in exchange for 
final goods often resulted in a domino effect that ultimately led to growth in the host 
country.  Nobel laureate Sir Arthur Lewis was often accredited with this phenomenon, 
particularly because he proposed policies that convinced foreign companies to establish 
industries in the small countries in the Caribbean to help them overcome trade 
limitations. The package often included tax holidays, tariff exemptions, export allowance, 
dividend payments and depreciation.   
Surprisingly, such incentives continue to be actively adopted by current 
governments to lure foreign companies. The logic for resorting to FDI is rooted in two 
main theoretical perspectives: Industrial organization and Trade Theory. Hymer (1960) 
and Macdougall (1960) respectively champion these theories. While Macdougall (1960) 
acknowledges MNCs contribution of intangible productive assets, Hymer (1960) 
criticizes their motives. Hymer (1960) argues that MNCs are motivated by three things: 
(1) Profit Exploitation 2) Elimination of Competition 3) Diversification and Risk 
Spreading. The author stipulates that MNCs have a size that unfairly accords them a 
competitive advantage to exploit opportunities abroad. He argues that they strategize to 
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displace local firms so as to maintain their dominance in the market while concurrently 
minimizing their overall risk. Hymer (1972) further argues that MNCs generally maintain 
high skilled positions in their home countries while creating only low skilled positions in 
the host country thereby dismissing the locals’ education and skills.  According to 
Mallampally & Sauvant (1999), UNCTAD identifies market seeking, resource/assets 
seeking and efficiency seeking as the main economic determinants of FDI and in that 
sense, parallels Hymer (1972)’s argument. The authors describe market seeking as 
involving strategic positioning of facilities to gain access to large markets while resource 
seeking involves the pursuit of natural resources or human capital that promise 
complementary benefits.  Efficiency seekers on the other hand are more driven by a 
desire for locations with low production costs.  
 In contrast to Hymer (1960), Macdougall (1960) proposes that host countries 
gain tremendously when they embrace FDI. These gains are realized particularly in 
employment, technology and capital flows.  Appleyard & Field (2001) discuss additional 
gains like increases in output, wages, exports, tax revenues, realization of economies of 
scale and weakening domestic monopoly.  The authors equally identify possible adverse 
effects on commodity terms of trade, decreases in domestic saving and investment, 
instability in the balance of payments and the exchange rate and increase in 
unemployment.  The question for us is how these factors play out in resource-abundant 
economies particularly its relation to the Dutch disease and Rent-seeking activities.  
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2.2 Natural Resource Curse, Dutch Disease & Rent Seeking  
The Natural Resource Curse remains as one of the most perplexing economic paradoxes 
ever studied. As explained by SW (1997), countries that are richly endowed with natural 
resources experience slower long-term growth than their less-endowed counterparts. 
They illustrate this graphically in figure 1 (see SW (1997) appendix) where the high ratio 
of natural resource exports to GDP in the base year 1970 is followed by slow growth 
from 1970-1990. They identify the Dutch disease and Rent-seeking activities as culprits 
in this process. The Dutch disease manifests itself as “de-industrialization” where the 
manufacturing and non-resource sectors collapse as a result of resources being diverted 
into natural resource production. By diverting resources like domestic investment, the 
natural resource sector has been described as  “crowding out” the other sectors.  For 
instance, Tietenburg (2006) comments that: “large rents in natural resource sector, 
“crowds out” most resources, including investment, thereby leading to 
underdevelopment”.  Both authors drive home the point that ultimately, economy-wide 
employment and long-term growth suffer and are negatively impacted.  
Another element of the Resource Curse is Rent-seeking activities. SW (1997) 
discusses earlier arguments that propose that resource-endowed countries have poor 
institutions because of high economic rents. They argue that rents from the thriving 
resource sector generate high corruption, inadequate red tapes as well as poor 
government efficiency. They depict an image of a “feeding frenzy” where government 
officials scramble to have a piece of the national cake. They argue that such inefficiencies 
depress investment demand and innovation because of special-interests groups and 
ultimately lead to a negative impact on growth. In effect the resource sector becomes the 
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center of attention of the whole economy thereby leaving no incentive to diversify other 
sectors. The end result is a downward spiral leading to economic slow down. SW (1997) 
comment that because rent seeking is a ‘dead weight loss”, activities that promote rent-
seeking activities are detrimental to overall growth.  The authors find a positive 
correlation between growth and good governance as well as with legal institutions. The 
implication is that these factors are pivotal for growth.   
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
We capture FDIs role in an economy with a typical aggregate production function that 
relates national output to the economy’s factors of production. Our model parallels 
Borensztein, De Gregorio & Lee (1998)(hereafter BDL (1998)). It reflects an economy 
where savings (investment), is the initial driving force of increases in the level of output.  
Yt = Aert Kt
! Lt
"
         (1) 
Where Yt is gross domestic product in time period t, r is the rate of technical progress, Kt 
is Capital Services in period t, Lt is Labor Services in period t and A represents a 
constant. 
Total investment in period t (It) is given by:  
It = St = DIt  St = !Yt        (2) 
Where St  is domestic savings in period t, DIt is domestic investment in period t and ! is 
the propensity to save. In effect, the domestic investment(It) which provides the stock of 
domestic capital is given by domestic savings(St). In autarky, the local owners of capital 
who tend to have a high marginal propensity to save, provide the investment. In effect  
total investment (It) is implicitly equivalent to domestic savings (St). 
The capital stock in period t (KSt) is given by: 
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KSt = KSt-1+ It  - "KSt-1        (3)  
Where KSt-1 is the capital stock at the end of the previous time period t-1 and # is the rate 
of depreciation. Typically, total current capital is derived from the accumulation of 
capital stock from the previous time period.  When investment increases, it causes a chain 
reaction. First, it generates an increase in capital stock and that in turn increases capital 
per worker. Ultimately, this raises the level of output per person.  As the cycle continues, 
there is an additional boost to savings and investment. Reinvestment of the savings and 
investment in the economy causes both Kt  and Yt to expand further.   
However as demonstrated by the Solow growth model, the amount of depreciation 
ultimately catches up with the amount of new investment and the economy then reaches a 
steady state. This implies that  the effect of an increase in investment on the rate of 
growth of Y is limited to the short-term and not sustainable in the long-run. With the 
introduction of foreign investment, the total investment will be given by:  
It =  DIt  + FIt   where FIt   is the foreign investment     (4) 
Foreign investment essentially supplements domestic investment and enhances 
overall investment It and ultimately capital stock Kt. This is especially desirable if DIt in 
the host country is low. As with the domestic investment, the initial impact on the 
economy is negligible but the compounding effect has greater significance. The foreign 
company contributes positively by providing the technology needed for long-term 
growth. This means that the rate of technical progress r may increase as a result of 
foreign investment. Contrary to a closed economy which is constrained by diminishing 
returns, foreign investment in an open economy serves as a catalyst for technological 
progress. It enables the country to use its capital and labor more efficiently to expand its 
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production. However, this effect may not be realized if the foreign company remits its 
profit back to the home country; basically the situation reverts back to autarky. Foreign 
investment in resource-endowed countries enables the host country to exploit its 
resources, which it otherwise cannot afford to undertake due to high research and 
extraction cost. In effect, foreign firms bear the high costs thereby sparing local firms of 
such a burden. The new opportunity also translates into higher overall output and 
government revenues.  
This process mirrors the staple model of economic growth aspect of the “vent for 
surplus” theory proposed by Richard Caves (1965) in that “resource-endowed” countries 
with “surplus” natural resource attract capital and labor from “less endowed” regions. 
The migration to such economies is driven by the demand for “intermediate goods” 
produced in the “less-endowed” countries. The end result is successive increases of total 
income and income per capita in both regions. While the model has been linked to 
development in some economies like Canada, some argue that the technological spillover 
effect which is reflected in an increase in r, may be minimal particularly because these 
sectors are more capital intensive than labor intensive.   
 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.1 Economic Growth 
FDI-led growth has emerged as one of the most predominant subjects in the growth 
literature. While the verdict remains mixed, a common theme that runs through the 
literature is the need for an environment that is conducive for growth. Barro (2001) lists 
variables like high levels of schooling, good health, low fertility, low government welfare 
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expenditures, rule of law and favorable terms of trade as being pivotal for growth. In his 
research he establishes a positive relationship between the growth rate of real per capita 
GDP and initial human capital for 98 countries from 1960-1985. In the aftermath, many 
studies have followed his lead in investigating these prime variables as the channels 
through which FDI impacts growth.   
For instance, BDL (1998) investigates the role of human capital and concludes 
that FDI contributes to economic growth only when the host country has adequate human 
capacity to maximize the technology being injected. In essence, high levels of human 
capital lead to high effect of FDI on economic growth. The authors also explore the 
possibility that FDI may “crowd out” domestic investment. They describe the  “crowding 
out” effect of domestic investment as the repression of domestic investment due to FDI 
absorbing credit in the product and financial markets.  The logic is that FDI can adversely 
impact capital accumulation and ultimately economic growth. They uncover that FDI 
does not “crowd out” but rather “crowds in” or induces investment.  
Blonigen and Wang (2004) attribute the positive correlation results in most 
studies to the erroneous sampling of data. They argue that contrary to their approach, 
most studies lump the two distinctive samples together and often draw conclusions that a 
positive correlation exists. They also find that FDI has a higher probability of “crowding 
in” investment in LDCs than DCs.  Early literature by Bornschier, Chase-Dunn & 
Rubinson (1978) demonstrate that, FDI has different implications when different 
measurements are used.  Upon separating FDI into “stocks3” and “flow4”, they find that 
current investment “flows” increases the rate of economic growth while “stocks” have a 
                                                
3  Bornschier et. al (1978) define FDI “stocks” as total cumulative value of foreign owned capital in a 
country 
4 They define “flows” as current account inflows of foreign capital for some time period 
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long-run negative effect. They attribute this fact to the slow down of inward foreign 
investment, which they stipulate translates into less physical capital and job formations.  
Kentor (1998) also finds similar results when he uses data from 1940-1990 to 
investigate the long-run effect of dependence on foreign investment. He concludes that 
countries that depend heavily on foreign capital have a slower rate of economic growth 
than the less dependent countries.  Both authors’ argue in favor of the dependency 
theory5.  Rothgeb (1984) shows that FDI has different effects for different third world 
countries. He finds that in third world countries, flows have a positive short-run effect on 
overall growth but stocks have a long-run negative effect. He equally finds that FDI 
correlates positively with growth in all sectors.  
4.2. Income Inequality 
In recent years, FDIs relation to Income Inequality has been associated with the 
global trend. Goldberg & Pavcnik (2007) remark that: “…all existing measures for 
inequality in developing countries seem to point to an increase in inequality which in 
some cases is severe”. Per the authors, globalization affects labor income, relative prices 
(consumption) and household production decisions. However, the country attributes, time 
and case equally play a significant role.  The authors argue that contrary to economic 
theories, globalization has not benefited the less-skilled in developing countries. In earlier 
literature, Bornshier & Balmer Cao (1979) find that FDI has a long-term effect of 
increasing income inequality6. They argue that FDI dependence affects class structure in 
the country and that in turn converts to political power and eventually increases income 
                                                
5 Kentor (1998) explain the “dependency theory” as implying that ownership of capital determines its effect 
on the underdeveloped economy  
6 Bornshier & Ballmer Cao (1979) define income inequality  as  “distribution of money income across 
households or individuals of a country  
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inequality. In effect personal income inequality is a function of the distribution of power. 
They also notice that countries with greater unequal income distributions attract more 
foreign investment meaning that both inequality and dependency go hand in hand. 
Alderson & Nielson’s (1999) study shows that FDI “stock” significantly increases 
income inequality. They argue that the shift of labor from the agriculture to the 
manufacturing sector is what causes this inequality. Their model encapsulates the 
Kuznets inverted “U” shape relationship between development and inequality. They 
stipulate that a rapid population growth increases income inequality by producing a large 
number of young people who earn low income and as a result inflate the bottom of the 
income distribution. This notion of labor shift in sectors equally applies to resource-
abundant economies.  For instance, Gleason (2000) remarks that high wages in the 
resource sector can lure innovators and entrepreneurs away from other sectors. This 
implies that labor will shift to the resource sector similarly to the development process.   
4.3 Poverty 
FDIs effect on poverty has equally been debated extensively. In the public domain, the 
subject of welfare gains for the poor in the global economy has been plagued with much 
skepticism. Aisbert (2005) discusses at length the many concerns. She attributes the 
confusion to misinterpretation of the evidence by extremists who are often driven by their 
own values and beliefs. In her assessment, vulnerability to external shocks is the biggest 
concern for the poor.  Meaning that FDI and trade liberalization could increase risks in 
poor households. She further argues that: “ the linkages between globalization policies 
and poverty outcomes are theoretically unclear and empirically hard to test”. While 
Fischer (2003) agrees about the challenges of globalization he concludes that: “…the 
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surest way to sustained poverty reduction is economic growth”. Given the correlation 
between FDI and economic growth it follows that FDI be used as the vehicle for poverty 
reduction. In a World Bank sponsored project, Klein, Aaron & Hadjimichael (2001) 
conclude that FDI is pivotal for poverty reduction. In their words, “Foreign direct 
investment remains one of the most effective tools in the fight against poverty”. They 
argue that FDI fosters a “rapid and efficient transfer and adoption of best practice” 
thereby leading to an “improvement in human capital” and ultimately  “broad-based” 
growth. The growth in turn becomes the main mode of poverty reduction.  
Contrary to Aisbert (2005), they argue that FDI can minimize negative shocks for 
the poor who are subjected to financial instability. In their investigation on liberalization 
and its perceived adverse effect on poverty, Winters, McCulloch & McKay (2004) did 
not find evidence of a negative effect on poverty. Their study was based on four settings:  
macro-economic aspects (growth and fluctuations), households and markets, wages and 
employment, and government revenue and spending. In response to criticisms about 
conventional measures of poverty, Firebaugh and Beck (1994) use Human Development 
Indexes (HDIs) as alternative measures of poverty. They use food consumption, infant 
survival, and life expectancy to study the effect of investment and trade dependence on 
the poor in 62 developing countries over a 20-year period. They find a large and robust 
effect of FDI on overall national welfare.  Some other studies propose that poverty is 
exacerbated in a global environment as a result of its relation to income inequality. For 
example, Goldberg & Pavcnik (2007) explain that the wage gap between the skilled and 
unskilled in a global setting widens thereby leading to poverty. They argue that in such an 
environment there is  “less secure employment and more volatile income”.  
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5. DATA & MODEL 
In our study, we perform a cross-country analysis of 69 developing countries over two 
decades, 1970-79 and 1980-89.  We use the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) 
technique similar to BDL (1998). Our FDI data is gross foreign direct inflows from the 
2001 World Bank Development Indicators CD while our Gini Index (measure of income 
inequality) and headcount index (measure of poverty) are from the World Bank 
PovcalNet.  We use control variables from both BDL (1998) and SW (1997) to allow 
comparisons to those studies.  
Included in this list of variables are initial GDP, human capital accumulation 
rates, government expenditure ratios, openness policy, changes in the external terms of 
trade, black market premium, terms of trade volatility, regional effects and efficiency of 
government institutions. The analysis will be two fold; in the first phase we have two 
models that examine the correlation between FDI and the Dutch Disease as well as FDI 
and Rent-Seeking in resource-endowed countries.  In the second phase we estimate FDIs 
impact on our main dependent variables: growth, income inequality and poverty in 
resource-endowed countries. We modify the Dutch disease model used by SW (1997) to 
reflect FDI and our key variable, FDI x SXP. Our model is in effect given by: 
DDit = b0,t + b1(SXP)it +   b2(FDI)it + b3(FDI x SXP)it + bIX + !it 
where DDit is the Dutch Disease for country i in period t and SXPit is the share of exports 
of primary products (natural resources) in GDP in 1970 for country i. SXPit comprises of 
both “non-fuel primary products” and “fuel” exports.  FDIit is inward foreign direct 
investment for country i in time period t and it is measured as the ratio of gross FDI 
inflows to GDP. FDI x SXP is the product between FDI and the primary export share 
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(SXP). It is our key variable that captures the interaction effect of the two variables. X 
represents other control variables used. Our dependent variables (increases in export 
share of manufactures (DMX), growth of services and manufactures output (GNR) and 
the output of the service sector relative to the manufacturing (SERVS)) correspond to the 
three sectors (tradeable natural resource sector, tradeable (non-resource) manufacturing 
sector and a non-traded sector) discussed by SW (1997).  
We share the authors’ premise that resource abundance causes more demand for 
non-traded goods thereby leading to the decline in the other sectors. The authors allude to 
early literature (Hirschman 1958, Seers 1964) arguments that the root of the negative 
impact lies with the absence of “backward and forward linkages” in the resource sector as 
supposed to the manufacturing sector. SW (1997) emphasize that the resource sectors 
technically miss out on positive externalities (learning-by-doing e.t.c) as well as 
increasing returns to education. The expected signs for the respective dependent variables 
(DMX, GNR, SERVS) in the Dutch Disease model are as follows: primary export share 
(–, –, +), foreign direct investment (+, +, –), product of foreign direct investment and 
primary export share (?,?,?).   
Our Rent Seeking Model is similarly given by: 
 RSKit= b0,t + b1(SXP)it +   b2(FDI)it + b3(FDI x SXP)it + bIX +!it 
where RSKit denotes rent-seeking activities and the explanatory variables remain as 
previously explained in the Dutch Disease model.  RSKit  is proxied by several variables: 
government repudiation of contracts index (GRC), risk of expropriation index (RE), 
corruption in government index (CORR), rule of law index (RL) and bureaucratic quality 
(BQ) index.  These measures range from low to high with respective corresponding 
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scales of (0-10), (0-10), (0-6), (0-6), (0-6). Earlier literature, (SW (1997)), suggests that 
SXPit  will have a negative coefficient; they argue that countries with abundant resources 
are typically characterized by poor institutions and governance. The signs for both FDI 
and the interaction term FDI x SXP could be either positive or negative. The next stage of 
our study involves the main dependent variables and estimates FDIs effect on growth in 
resource abundant countries. The model has the same explanatory variables as the 
previous models and is given as:  
GRit= b0,t + b1(SXP)it +   b2(FDI)it + b3(FDI x SXP)it + bIX +!it 
GR denotes per capita growth and is calculated as the average annual rate of per capita 
real GDP over each decade, 1970-79 and 1980-89.  
The main hypothesis is summed up as follows: 
H0 :   b3 # 0 (FDI decreases growth in resource-endowed countries) 
HA :  b3 > 0 (FDI increases growth in resource-endowed countries) 
In the model, a positive coefficient on the interaction term FDI x SXP indicates 
that FDI is compelling enough to overcome the Dutch disease and induce overall growth. 
It also implies that resource abundance is not an impediment to FDI-led growth.   
The income inequality effect, is similarly estimated by the model: 
GINIit = b0,t + b1(SXP )it +   b2(FDI)it + b3(FDI x SXP)it + bIX +!it 
where GINI denotes the gini index and measures the inequality of the income or wealth 
distribution in the country population. In this scenario, we are testing the hypothesis: 
H0 :  = b3 # 0 (FDI decreases income inequality in resource-endowed countries) 
HA  = b3 > 0  (FDI increases income inequality in resource-endowed countries) 
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Based on previous studies (SW 1997), we expect our interaction term FDI x SXP 
to have a positive sign. We argue that FDI increases income inequality in resource-
endowed countries for two reasons: (1) divergence in wages due to the shift in labor from 
both the manufacturing and non-resource sector to the resource sector in the short-run (2) 
divergence in wages due to unemployment stemming from the collapse of both the 
manufacturing and non-resource sector in the long-run. This is in line with Gleason 
(2000)’s remark that high wages in the resource sector can lure innovators and 
entrepreneurs away from other sectors.  In testing FDIs effect on poverty we use the 
following model:    
 HEADCOUNTit= b0,t + b1(SXP)it +   b2(FDI)it + b3(FDI x SXP)it + bIX +!it 
Where HEADCOUNT is the measure of poverty. It is represented by the share of a 
population living in households with income below the $1 poverty line. The hypothesis is 
essentially summed up as: 
H0 :  b3 $ 0 FDI increases poverty in resource-endowed countries 
HA:  b3 < 0  FDI  decreases poverty in resource-endowed countries 
Previous literature (Klein, Aaron & Hadjimichael 2001) suggests that FDI will typically 
have a negative coefficient however with the presence of the resource-endowment 
variable in this study, the sign is uncertain.  
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Evidence of Dutch Disease? 
6.11 Crowding-out of domestic investment? 
Table 1 summarizes the “crowding out” effect of domestic investment. In regression 1.1, 
we find that primary export share (SXP) has a negative effect on domestic investment 
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although not significant. This sign is consistent with SW (1997)’s results where they 
conclude that SXP “crowds out” domestic investment. On the hand, the coefficient for 
FDI in regression 1.2 is positive and robust similar to BDL (1998). This reflects a  
“crowding-in” effect and implies that FDI compliments domestic investment. Our 
interaction term FDI x SXP has a positive sign in regressions 1.3 through 1.6. This sign is 
maintained when the regional dummies and the institutional quality variable are included. 
However the coefficient gains significance only with the addition of the institutional 
variable. We conclude that in resource-endowed countries, FDI “crowd outs” domestic 
investment. 
6.12   Sector Changes 
Table 2 presents the results of our Dutch disease model constructed in section 5. In 
regression 2.1 we find that FDI has a positive effect on the share of manufacturing 
exports (DMX) meaning that FDI enhances manufacturing export share. On the other 
hand, primary export share (SXP) maintains a negative sign consistent with SW (1997). 
The authors find that resource-endowed countries have a slower growth in their 
manufacturing export share. Interestingly, the coefficient for our interaction term FDI x 
SXP, turns up positive.  
 This result is interesting because it implies that FDI has the propensity of 
inducing growth in the manufacturing sector of resource-abundant countries thereby 
reversing the Dutch disease. Following SW (1997), we further examine growth in the 
non-resource economy. Our results in regression 2.2 shows that both FDI and our 
interaction term, FDI x SXP have negative associations with growth in the non-resource 
economy (GNR). Next, we examine the output of the non-traded sector relative to the 
manufacturing sector.  In regression 2.3, SXP, FDI and our key term FDI x SXP all have 
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a positive sign. While our signs are not significant for SXP and our interaction term, FDI 
x SXP, it is significant for the stand-alone FDI. 
6.2 Evidence of Rent-Seeking? 
Our results in Table 3, supports SW (1997)’s findings that resource abundance is 
negatively correlated with all the indicators of good governance and quality institutions. 
FDI on the other hand is positively associated with these indicators.  The positive 
coefficient we get for our interaction variable FDI x SXP, suggests that in resource-
endowed countries, FDI is positively associated with government repudiation contracts 
(grc), rule of law (rl) and bureaucratic quality (bq).  This implies that the presence of 
MNCs can to some extent be encouraging governments to strive for a better investment 
climate. Our assessment of the negative correlation with corruption (corr) and the risk of 
expropriation (re) is that inefficiencies associated with corruption and government 
interventions may be the biggest impediment to a promising private sector. These 
preliminary regressions provide an insight on how the Dutch disease and rent seeking 
activities may influence FDIs effect on our key dependent variables.  
6.3 Economic Growth 
Our first regression 4.1 presents an autarky scenario with only domestic investment and 
the control variables: initial income (GDP), male schooling (School), government 
expenditure (Govt Exp), black market premium (Blk Mrkt Premium) and primary export 
share (SXP).  Similar to SW (1997), our domestic investment turns up with a positive and 
significant coefficient while our primary export share (SXP) is negative and significant. 
Next, we assess the significance of FDI by excluding domestic investment in regression 
4.2 in contrast to the previous regression; FDI turns up positive and statistically 
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significant while SXP maintains the same negative sign.  This result suggests that FDI 
has a greater impact than domestic investment (coefficient of 0.28 in regression 4.1 
versus 0.16 in 4.2). In regression 4.4 we replace FDI with FDI x SXP and test the effect 
of our interaction term; we get a positive and significant coefficient. For a more complete 
assessment of the variables’ impact on growth both individually and interactively, we 
include SXP, FDI and FDI x SXP in the next regression 4.5. The coefficient for our 
interaction term turns up positive and significant.  Just as we hypothesize, FDI has a 
dominant effect and overshadows the adverse effect of the Dutch Disease and Rent-
seeking activities. This also brings to question the argument that FDI in resource sector 
generally lacks positive “spillover” or externalities.   
Based on the results from our Dutch disease model, we argue that natural resource 
production does not necessarily promote de-industrialization as previous literature 
suggests. Under certain circumstances such as where FDI is present, one may observe a 
contradiction; the manufacturing sector could benefit. It really depends on how the 
revenues from the resource sector are used. Our specification in regression 4.5 suggests 
that the effect of FDI on growth can be calculated as b2(FDI)it + b3(FDI x SXP)it. Given 
that our coefficients for FDI and FDI x SXP are 0.045 and 1.637 respectively, the effect 
of FDI on growth is: 0.045(FDI)+1.637 (FDI x SXP). Using a 1980 sample mean where 
resource endowed countries have a mean ratio of 0.24 to GDP, we deduce that a unit 
standard deviation (0.021) in the FDI to GDP increases growth by 0.08 percentage 
points7. While this one-time gain may be considered negligible, the compound effect as 
echoed by Van Den Berg (2003) is generally significant. This implies that resource-
                                                
7Economic Growth=0.045(FDI)+1.637(FDI x SXP)*0.021(FDI Standard Deviation)  
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endowed countries could overcome the natural resource curse as they embrace FDI over 
time. We also observe that the coefficient for the individual variables FDI and SXP, are 
consistent with BDL (1998) and SW (1997); they are positive and negative respectively. 
Our interaction term, FDI x SXP continues to be robust in subsequent regressions that 
include additional variables. For our regional dummies of Africa and Latin America in 
regression 4.6, our coefficients turn up negative however the coefficient for Africa is not 
statistically significant. Our quality of institutional variable on the other hand turns out 
positive and significant in regression 4.7. 
6.4 Income Inequality 
In regression 5.1 we assess the effect of our stand-alone variables, FDI and SXP while 
controlling for variables employed in previous studies. FDI turns up with a positive 
coefficient. Our result is consistent with Alderson & Nielson (1998). We also get a 
positive and significant coefficient in regression 5.2 where we substitute the stand-alone 
FDI with the interaction term, FDI x SXP. In our main regression 5.3, we include the 
interaction term FDI x SXP along with the stand-alone variables FDI and SXP to better 
evaluate the joint effect. The coefficient for our interaction term turns up positive and 
significant just as we hypothesize.  
This result suggests that FDIs positive association with income inequality as 
observed in previous studies equally applies to resource-endowed countries. We argue 
that the inequality is rooted in the wage gap between the resource sector and the other 
sectors caused by the demand for and shift in labor from the non-traded sector into the 
resource sector. The notion of sector transitions inducing inequality in the short-term 
parallels Kuznets hypothesis. He argues that inequality is a result of workers moving 
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form the agriculture sector to the industry sector or rural workers migrating to urban jobs. 
Consequently, this problem can be addressed with diversification (development of other 
sectors) along with policies that improve institutions and enhance trade. In regression 5.4 
we find evidence that a country’s level of openness decreases income inequality. 
Following Barro (2000)’s argument about the role of credit in an economy, we introduce 
the financial depth variable in regression 5.5. This variable reflects the financial 
development and relevance of credit in a country. We find a negative effect (a decrease) 
on income inequality though not significant.  
6.5 Poverty 
Our main result reveals that while FDI decreases poverty, elements of the natural 
resource curse which characterize resource-abundant countries, undermines and reverses 
this effect. Similarly to our preceding analysis, our regression 6.1 begins with an autarky 
scenario where only domestic investment prevails. Regression 6.2 then follows with an 
addition of the FDI variable. In the respective regressions, both stand-alone variables, 
SXP and FDI have a negative effect on poverty. Interestingly, in our subsequent 
regressions 6.3 through 6.6, our interaction term, FDI x SXP has an increasing effect on 
poverty although not statistically significant. The positive sign persists with the addition 
of the regional and institutional variables in regressions 6.5 and 6.6. We argue that this 
increase in poverty is the long-term effect of unemployment in the non-
thriving/collapsing sectors.  
6.7 Handling Endogeneity 
One of the challenges of using cross-country studies is the problem of endogeneity. 
Endogeneity implies that the dependent variable (FDI) as well as the independent 
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variables (growth, income inequality and poverty) may concurrently be affected by a 
common denominator. This is undesirable because it causes correlation and also biases 
the coefficient estimates. To address this problem we use log value of land, East and 
South Asia as instrumental variables in a three stage least square (3SLS) estimation 
similar to BDL (1998).  The results are summarized in table 7, 8 and 9. These results are 
similar to the primary SUR results. Overall, our interaction term, FDI x SXP, shows that 
FDI has a positive effect on growth, income inequality and poverty in resource-endowed 
countries.    
7. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we demonstrate that in resource-endowed countries, sector changes and 
institutional quality, both of which reflect the Dutch disease and Rent-seeking behavior, 
are mechanisms by which FDI affects growth, income inequality and poverty. We find 
that FDI has a positive association with growth, income inequality and poverty.  While an 
increasing effect on income inequality and poverty may be alarming for some readers, we 
caution that these welfare issues are functions of wealth distribution and should therefore 
be remedied by sound social policies.  
Given that growth remains the most effective vehicle for poverty reduction (see 
Klein, Aaron & Hadjimichael (2001)), governments should use that as a springboard for 
social and economy-wide development. As Tietenberg (2006) points out, “the linkage 
between growth and the poor depends more upon the willingness to transfer than on 
direct market effects”. Among other approaches, revenues gained from the natural 
resource sector should be allocated efficiently. A diverse economy should also be 
supported on a continuous basis to ensure that no one sector is compromised. Given the 
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role of institutions it is imperative that good governance and institutions be maintained. 
Protectionist policies against FDI should also be avoided as this will be counter- 
productive. While this study has shed light on FDIs performance in resource-abundant 
economies, it falls short on current data. We recommend that future research involve such 
data to better assess FDIs impact in this globalization era. We also recommend an 
investigation into specific use of government revenues from the resource sectors.  
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ENDNOTES 
1. In this paper, we use the terms “resource-abundant” and “resource-endowed” 
interchangeably. 
2. Van Den Berg (2003) allude to the fact that economic growth is a precursor for 
economic development and therefore is a good proxy. We in turn use economic 
growth to imply economic development.  
3. The Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) technique that we adopt from BDL 
(1998), enables latent factors to affect the dependent variables simultaneously 
over the two periods. Except for the constant, all the coefficients are constrained 
in each regression.  
4. See SW (1997) and BDL (1998) for explicit explanation and calculation of all 
variables and data 
5. We adopt instrumental variables used by BDL (1998) so as to make our study 
comparable to such renowned authors 
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Appendix 1 
Variables 
Growth: Growth rate calculated as the average annual rate of per capita real GDP   
 
Headcount: 8The headcount index for the $1 a day poverty line. It shows the share of a population (in 
millions) living in households with consumption or income per person below the poverty 
line (ratio) 
  
Gini: Gini Index (ratio); measure of inequality of income or wealth distribution in the country 
population. It is a ratio that ranges from 0 to 1 with 0 meaning perfect equality 
(everybody has same income) and 1 implies perfect inequality (one person has all the 
income). A high gini means high inequality 
 
FDI: Ratio of Foreign direct investment inflows from the period 1970-1979 to the host 
country’s GDP 
 
SXP: Share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1970. Primary products or natural 
resource exports are exports of “fuels” and “non-fuel primary products”.  Both numerator 
and denominator are measured in nominal dollars 
.  
FDI x SXP: Product of FDI inflows and primary exports share (SXP) 
 
Ln(Gdp): Log value of real GDP in 1970 and 1980 
 
School: The initial-year level (1970) of average years of the secondary schooling in the male 
population over the age of 25 
 
Govt Exp: The average share of real government consumption in real GDP in 1970 
 
Blk Mrkt Prem: Black market premium on foreign exchange. Calculated as the difference between 
parallel exchange market and official exchange market 
 
Dtt: The average annual growth in the log of the external terms of trade. The external terms of 
trade is the ratio of an export price index to an import price index  
 
Smx:   Share of manufacturing exports in total exports 
 
Gnr: Real growth per-capita in the non-natural resource sector of the economy. Calculated as 
growth in the sum of real value added in manufactures and service sectors 
  
Lgdpnr; Natural log of GNP produced in sectors other than the natural resource sector.  
 
Dmx:  Change in the share of manufacturing exports in total exports;   
   
Servs:  Ratio of value added in services to value added in manufacturing 
 
Investment: Domestic investment rate 
 
Inflation: Inflation rate is a measure of percentage in the GDP deflator 
                                                
8 These measures are based on a poverty line of $32.74 per month at the 1993 PPP. This represents the “ $1 
a day” poverty line 
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Fdepth: Financial Depth measured as currency plus demand deposits and other interest bearing 
liabilities of banks and non-bank intermediaries as a share of GDP 
 
Openess: The fraction of years which the country is rated as an open economy  
 
Safrica:  Sub-Saharan African dummy 
 
Laam:  Latin American dummy 
 
Rl:  Rule of Law index. This variable “reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country 
are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and 
adjudicate disputes” Scored 0 (low) -6 (high).  
 
Bq:   Bureaucratic quality index.  A high score means “autonomy from 
political pressure”, and “strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in 
policy or interruptions in government services.” Scored 0-6. 
 
Corr: Corruption in government index.  A low score means “illegal payments are generally 
expected throughout government”, in the form of “bribes connected with import and 
export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police 
protection, or loans.” Scored 0-6. 
 
Re: Risk of expropriation index.  Scored 0-10, with lower scores for high risk of “outright 
confiscation” or “forced nationalization.” 
 
Grc:  Government repudiation of contracts index. Scored 0-10, with a 
low score indicating high “risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of a 
repudiation, postponement or scaling down.” 
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Appendix 2 
List of Countries 
Algeria Guatemala Pakistan 
Argentina Guyana Papua New Guinea 
Bangladesh Haiti Paraguay 
Barbados Honduras Peru 
Benin Hong Kong, China Philippines 
Bolivia India Rwanda 
Botswana Indonesia Senegal 
Brazil Iran, Islamic Rep. Sierra Leone 
Cameroon Israel Singapore 
Central African Republic Jamaica Sri Lanka 
Chile Jordan Swaziland 
Colombia Kenya Syrian Arab Republic 
Congo, Dem. Rep.(Zaire) Korea, Rep. Taiwan, China 
Congo, Rep. Lesotho Thailand 
Costa Rica Malawi Togo 
Cyprus Malaysia Trinidad and Tobago 
Dominican Republic Mali Tunisia 
Ecuador Malta Turkey 
El Salvador Mauritius Uganda 
Gambia, The Mexico Uruguay 
Ghana Mozambique Venezuela 
Greece Myanmar Yemen, Rep. 
 Niger Zambia 
  Zimbabwe 
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FDI Inflows, By Host Region and Selected Host Economy, 2003-05  
(Billions Of Dollars)  
 
Host region/economy 2003a  2004a 2005b Growth Rates 
World  637.8  695  896.7  29  
Developed Economies  447.1  414.7  537.2  38  
Europe  358.9  258.2  449.2  74  
European Union(25)  340  259  445  72  
EU-15  327.6  231.4  407.7  76  
United Kingdom  27.4  77.6  219.1  182  
New10EUMemberStates  12.5  27.8  37.7  36  
Czech Republic  2.1  4.5  12.5  181  
United States  57  96  106  11  
Japan  6.3  7.8  9.4  21  
Developing Economies  172.1  243.1  273.5  13  
Africa  17.2  18.7  28.9  55  
Latin America and Caribbean  48  68.9  72  5  
Brazil  10.1  18.2  15.5  -15  
Chile  4.4  7.6  7  -8  
Mexico  12.8  17.9  17.2  -4  
Asia and Oceania  106.9  155.5  172.7  11  
West Asia  11.9  17.6  26.5  51  
South, East and South East Asia  94.7  137.8  146.2  6  
South, East and South East Asia  53.5  60.6  60.3  -0.54  
South, East and South East Asia  13.6  34  39.7  17  
South, East and South East Asia  4.3  5.3  6  12  
South, East and South East Asia  9.3  16.1  15.9  -1  
 Source: UNCTAD (2005) 
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TABLE 1: FDI-EXPORT SHARE INTERACTION & CROWDING OUT (SUR)  
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TABLE 2: FDI-EXPORT SHARE INTERACTION & DUTCH DISEASE (SUR) 
  
VARIABLES   SECTORAL CHANGES 
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TABLE 3: FDI-EXPORT SHARE INTERACTION & RENT-SEEKING (SUR) 
 
VARIABLES   INSTITUTIONS 
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TABLE 4: FDI-EXPORT SHARE INTERACTION AND GROWTH (SUR) 
 
VARIABLES    PER CAPITA GROWTH (GR) 
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:0#0&&1!
+0#0"2/!
:0#0%91!
+0#0"(/!
:0#0(311!
+0#0"9/!
:0#0('11!
+0#0"2/!
:0#0'211!
+0#0"(/!
:0#0(011!
+0#0"3/!
-7EDM<K5!H*;! 0#"(%11!
+0#0%&/!
! 0#"$011!
+0#0%"/!
0#"&"11!
+0#0$2/!
0#"%&11!
+0#0%"/!
0#03911!
+0#0%&/!
0#"0$11!
+0#0%2/!
G-H! ! 0#$2011!
+0#09(/!
0#"3"11!
+0#09"/!
! 0#0&'!
+0#03"/!
0#0'&!
+0#03$/!
0#090!
+0#"%3/!
G-H!>!4F.! ! ! ! "#2%%11!
+0#&3&/!
"#(%911!
+0#(%&/!
"#(%&11!
+0#'93/!
$#92(1!
+"#%"(/!
4IJCK5L! ! ! ! ! ! :0#00$!
+0#009/!
:0#0"%!
+0#002/!
)LLE! ! ! ! ! ! :0#0"'11!
+0#00'/!
:0#0""11!
+0#00&/!
H*M<K<N<K7*M! ! ! ! ! ! ! 0#00&1!
+0#00$/!
O7#!7J!PQM! &2! %2! %2! %2! %2! %2! %0!
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%  
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TABLE 5: FDI-EXPORT SHARE INTERACTION & INCOME INEQUALITY (SUR) 
 
VARIABLES    GINI INDEX  (GINI) 
! '#"! '#$! '#%! '#&! '#'!
)*!+K*K<KL8!,-./! 0#0"'!
+0#0"3/!
0#0""!
+0#0"2/!
0#0"$!
+0#0"2/!
0#0""!
+0#0"2/!
0#0"%!
+0#0"3/!
@8A!BCA<!.CDEKNE! :0#00%!
+0#0"3/!
0#00$!
+0#0"'/!
0#00%!
+0#0"'/!
0#00$!
+0#0"(/!
0#00$!
+0#0"(/!
4F.! :0#003!
+0#0(2/!
:0#"09!
+0#09&/!
:0#"0(!
+0#09'/!
:0#"02!
+0#09(/!
:0#"00!
+0#02$/!
G-H! 0#00"!
+0#%%2/!
! 0#0'&!
+0#%"0/!
0#0&'!
+0#%03/!
0#0('!
+0#%"3/!
WDCEM!7J!WCLTD! 0#000!
+0#000/!
:0#00"!
+0#000/!
:0#00"!
+0#000/!
:0#00"!
+0#00"/!
0#000!
+0#00"/!
G-H!>!4F.! ! &#$$31!
+"#9$2/!
&#%"01!
+"#99&/!
&#&301!
+"#2&(/!
&#%'01!
+"#3%9/!
O7#!7J!XDLCM!P?D*! ! ! ! :0#003!
+0#0$$/!
:0#009!
+0#0$%/!
GK*L*5KL8!-D?<6! ! ! ! ! :0#0""!
+0#0&%/!
O7#!7J!PQM! %0! %0! %0! %0! %0!
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%  
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TABLE 6: FDI-EXPORT SHARE INTERACTION AND POVERTY (SUR) 
 
VARIABLES   HEADCOUNT INDEX (HEADCOUNT) 
! (#"! (#$! (#%! (#&! (#'! (#(!
)*+,-./! :0#"2$11!
+0#0$(/!
:0#"9(11!
+0#0$2/!
:0#"2%11!
+0#0$9/!
:0#"2311!
+0#0$2/!
:0#"$311!
+0#0%3/!
:0#"0311!
+0#0&$/!
WDCEM!7J!
WCLTD!
:0#000!
+0#00$/!
:0#00"!
+0#00$/!
!:0#00$!
+0#00$/!
:0#00%!
+0#00$/!
!:0#00%!
+0#00$/!
:0#00"!
+0#00$/!
4F.! :0#"03!
+0#03%/!
:0#$%$1!
+0#"03/!
:0#%&"1!
+0#"%%/!
:0#&0011!
+0#"&$/!
:0#%&"1!
+0#"&0/!
:0#""&!
+0#"&$/!
-7EDM<K5!
H*;DM<ED*<!
:0#(3"11!
+0#$$(/!
:0#'201!
+0#$&2/!
:0#'""1!
+0#$%2/!
:0#&09!
+0#$'3/!
:0#"'"!
+0#$'(/!
:0#&(0!
+0#$&(/!
O7#!7J!XDLCM!
P?D*!
:0#00'!
+0#0%3/!
:0#0"9!
+0#0%2/!
:0#0%(!
+0#0%2/!
:0#0&%!
+0#0&0/!
:0#0"$!
+0#0%2/!
0#0"$!
+0#0%3/!
G-H! !
!
:0#&$2!
+0#("'/!
!
!
:0#2$0!
+0#(&0/!
:"#""9!
+0#'2'/!
:&#%9311!
+"#''&/!
G-H!>!4F.! ! ! &#909!
+$#32%/!
'#2$(!
+%#"(9/!
$#%3%!
+%#%$"/!
'#29&!
+(#&&0/!
4IJCK5L! ! ! ! ! 0#$0'11!
+0#0($/!
0#"3911!
+0#0'(/!
)LLE! ! ! ! ! 0#0(0!
+0#0'0/!
0#0&0!
+0#0&&/!
H*M<K<N<K7*M! ! ! ! ! ! 0#0$921!
+0#0"%/!
O7#!7J!PQM! &"! %(! %(! %(! %(! $3!
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%  
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TABLE 7: FDI-EXPORT SHARE INTERACTION & GROWTH (3SLS) 
 
VARIABLES   PER CAPITA GROWTH 
! 9#"! 9#$! 9#%! 9#&! 9#'! 9#(! 9#9!
)*!+K*K<KL8!
,-./!
:0#0"'11!
+0#00&/!
:0#00(!
+0#00&/!
:0#0"$11!
+0#00&/!
:0#0"%11!
+0#00&/!
:0#0"%11!
+0#00&/!
:0#00%!
+0#00'/!
:0#0"211!
+0#00'/!
456778! 0#0021!
+0#00&/!
0#00(!
+0#00&/!
!0#00'!
+0#00%/!
0#00(!
+0#00%/!
!0#00(!
+0#00%/!
0#00'!
+0#00%/!
0#00$!
+0#00%/!
,7;<!
=>?D*TK<NCD!
:0#0%0!
+0#0%(/!
:0#0&0!
+00%2/!
:0#0%2!
+0#0%%/!
:0#0&'!
+0#0%%/!
:0#0&'!
+0#0%%/!
:0#09%1!
+0#0%$/!
:0#0%$!
+0#0$9/!
@8A!BCA<!
.CDEKNE!
:0#0"%1!
+0#00(/!
:0#0$"11!
+0#00(/!
:0#0"211!
+0#00(/!
:0#0"'11!
+0#00'/!
:0#0"'11!
+0#00'/!
:0#0""11!
+0#00'/!
:0#003!
+0#00(/!
4F.! :0#0%211!
+0#0'0/!
:0#0&&1!
+0#0"3/!
:0#0%(1!
+0#0"(/!
:0#0(311!
+0#0"9/!
:0#0('11!
+0#0"2/!
:0#0'911!
+0#0"(/!
:0#0("11!
+0#0"2/!
-7EDM<K5!
H*;DM<ED*<!
0#"($11!
+0#0%%/!
! 0#"$011!
+0#0%"/!
0#"&"11!
+0#0$2/!
0#"%&11!
+0#0%"/!
0#03"1!
+0#0&&/!
0#"0(1!
+0#0&"/!
G-H! ! 0#$9&11!
+0#09(/!
0#"3"11!
+0#090/!
! 0#0&(!
+0#03"/!
0#0$"!
+0#"00/!
0#0'2!
+0#"%(/!
G-H!>!4F.! ! ! ! "#2%%11!
+0#&3'/!
"#(%%1!
+0#(%9/!
"#'3211!
+0#''%/!
%#%3'1!
+"#$33/!
4IJCK5L! ! ! ! ! ! 0#00&!
+0#0""/!
:0#0"(!
+0#0"0/!
)LLE! ! ! ! ! ! :0#0$$1!
+0#022/!
:0#"$"!
+0#009/!
H*M<K<N<K7*M! ! ! ! ! ! ! 0#00'1!
+0#00$/!
O7#!7J!PQM! &2! %2! %2! %2! %2! %2! %0!
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%  
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TABLE 8: FDI-EXPORT SHARE INTERACTION & INCOME INEQUALITY (3SLS) 
 
VARIABLES    GINI INDEX 
! 2#"! 2#$! 2#%! 2#&! 2#'!
)*!+K*K<KL8!,-./! 0#0$$!
+0#0"3/!
0#0"$!
+0#0"2/!
0#0"%!
+0#0"9/!
0#0"$!
+0#0"2/!
0#0"&!
+0#0"3/!
4F.! 0#009!
+0#0("/!
:0#"0$!
+0#09$/!
!:0#"0"!
+0#09%/!
:0#"0$!
+0#09%/!
!:0#03&!
+0#093/!
@8A!BCA<!.CDEKNE! 0#00&!
+0#0"'/!
0#00&!
+0#0"&/!
0#00&!
+0#0"'/!
0#00&!
+0#0"'/!
0#00&!
+0#0"'/!
WDCEM!7J!WCLTD! 0#000!
+0#000/!
:0#00"!
+0#00"/!
:0#00"!
+0#00"/!
:0#000!
+0#00"/!
:0#000!
+0#00"/!
G-H! :0#"&%!
+0#$3%/!
! 0#0'%!
+0#0'2/!
0#0&&!
+0#%00/!
0#0((!
+0#%03/!
G-H!>!4F.! ! &#"%%1!
+"#(99/!
&#$""1!
+"#9%$/!
&#%991!
+"#930/!
&#$$'1!
+"#29"/!
Y!7J!XDLCM!P?D*! ! ! ! :0#002!
+0#0$"/!
:0#00(!
+0#0$$/!
GK*L*5KL8!-D?<6! ! ! ! ! :0#0""!
+0#0&0/!
O7#!7J!PQM! %0! %0! %0! %0! %0!
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%  
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TABLE 9: FDI-EXPORT SHARE INTERACTION & POVERTY (3SLS) 
 
VARIABLES   HEADCOUNT INDEX 
! 3#"! 3#$! 3#%! 3#&! 3#'! 3#(!
)*!+,-./! :0#"2$11!
+0#0$'/!
:0#"2%11!
+0#0$2/!
:0#"3$11!
+0#0$(/!
:0#$0$11!
+0#0$9/!
:0#"&(11!
+0#0%(/!
:0#"$011!
+0#0%2/!
WDCEM!7J!WCLTD! !0#000!
+0#00"/!
:0#00"!
+0#00"/!
!:0#00$!
+0#00$/!
:0#00%!
+0#00$/!
!:0#00$!
+0#00$/!
!0#000!
+0#00"/!
4F.! :0#""$!
+0#022/!
:0#$$91!
+0#"0"/!
:0#%%01!
+0#"$(/!
:0#%3211!
+0#"$3/!
:0#$2(1!
+0#""3/!
:0#"0%!
+0#"$%/!
-7EDM<K5!
H*;DM<ED*<!
:0#($211!
+0#$""/!
:0#%'&!
+0#$%"/!
:0#&%2!
+0#$%0/!
:0#$09!
+0#%2(/!
:0#0'%!
+0#$$2/!
:0#%'"!
+0#$"9/!
O7#!7J!XDLCM!P?D*! :0#0""!
+0#0%(/!
:0#0$2!
+0#0%(/!
:0#0&9!
+0#0%(/!
:0#0'9!
+0#0%(/!
:0#0&%!
+0#0%%/!
:0#00'!
+0#0%&/!
G-H! ! :0#332!
+0#'2'/!
! :"#"("!
+0#'22/!
:"#$$'1!
+0#''$/!
:&#0$911!
+"#%'0/!
G-H!>!4>?! ! ! '#$&2!
+"#'$&/!
(#$$$1!
+$#2&3/!
$#9'&!
+$#2$'/!
(#"%'!
+'#&"$/!
4IJCK5L! ! ! ! ! 0#$$211!
+0#0'3/!
0#$0%11!
+0#0''/!
)LLE! ! ! ! ! 0#02"!
+0#0&3/!
0#0'$!
+0#$%"/!
H*M<K<N<K7*M! ! ! ! ! ! 0#0$21!
+0#0"$/!
O7#!7J!PQM! &"! %(! %(! %(! %(! $3!
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. **significant at  1%; *significant at 5%  
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ABBREVIATIONS  
 
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment  
 
MNCs: Multinational Corporations 
 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product  
 
SUR: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions  
 
3SLS: Three-Stage Least Square  
 
IV: Instrumental Variables  
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